Abstract. An attack on a recently proposed authentication scheme of Shpilrain and Ushakov is presented. The public information allows the derivation of a system of polynomial equations for the secret key bits. Our attack uses simple elimination techniques to distill linear equations. For the proposed parameter choice, the attack often finds secret keys or alternative secret keys within minutes with moderate resources.
Introduction
In [2] Shpilrain and Ushakov propose an authentication scheme, using 2 × 2 matrices over the algebra of "truncated polynomials" F 2 [x]/(x N ). Below we describe a simple heuristic approach to derive linear equations from the public key, that often allows the secret key or an alternative secret key to be found. For the proposed value N = 300, typical observed running times are a few minutes using a computer algebra system on a Linux PC.
The proposed authentication scheme
For our purposes it is enough to recall the key generation of the proposal in [2] . Details of the actual authentication scheme are not relevant for our attack, and we refer to the original paper [2] for protocol details. By R := F 2 [x]/(x N ) we denote the quotient of the univariate polynomial ring F 2 [x] by the ideal (x N ), and we write R * := {f (x) ∈ R : f (0) = 0} for the elements in R with constant coefficient 1. Moreover, for f ∈ R and g = g(x) ∈ R \ R * , we write f • g := f (g(x)) ∈ R for the functional composition of f with g. The key generation of the scheme proposed by Shpilrain and Ushakov can be summarized as follows:
Secret key: Choose s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ∈ R * uniformly at random. Public key: Choose w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ∈ R * and p 1 , p 2 ∈ R \ R * uniformly at random. 1 The public key is (p 1 , p 2 , w 1 , . . . , w 4 , t 1 , . . . , t 4 ) where
Given such a public key (p 1 , p 2 , w 1 , . . . , w 4 , t 1 , . . . , t 4 ) for the proposed choice N = 300, the goal of our attack is to find s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ∈ R * with
In other words s 1 , . . . , s 4 serve as alternative secret key. As noted in [2] , this is sufficient to impersonate the owner of the actual secret s 1 , . . . , s 4 .
Attacking the secret key
Our starting point is to replace each unkown bit η ij of the secret key
by an indeterminate y ij . This yields a system of 4
1. Evaluate the matrix product on the right hand side of Equation (1) with each s i being replaced by a generic sum 1 + N −1 j=1 y ij x j and computations being performed modulo (x N ). 2. For each matrix entry, equate the coefficients of all x j (1 ≤ j < N ) on both sides of Equation (1).
By construction, we know these polynomials to have a common root over F 2 . Hence we could add the relations
and then try to compute a lexicographic Gröbner basis to find a zero of the resulting (zero-dimensional) system of equations. Our attack tries to avoid this, potentially expensive, computation of a (lexicographic) Gröbner basis. Instead, we resort to a heuristic approach, which experimentally turned out to perform well.
Deriving linear equations
We process the coefficients one by one and try to derive linear equations by means of a truncated Gröbner basis computation. More specifically, starting with degree d = 1, the proposed attack proceeds as follows: In general, the approach in Figure 1 does not yield a unique solution for s 1 , . . . , s 4 . In our experiments we simply set all variables in the remaining system of polynomial equations to 0, and tested if the resulting candidate key satisfies Equation (1). If not, we counted the attack as failed. This heuristic is based on the observation that in many cases the only constraints on the remaining variables are of the form y 2 ij = y ij , i. e., we can choose any value from F 2 for y ij .
Experimental results
Using the computer algebra system Magma [1], we experimented with different values for N . Our main interest was in the proposed choice N = 300, but the attack worked well with larger instances (N = 1000), too. Truncated degree-2 Gröbner bases were computed with Magma's command GroebnerBasis(·,2).-Note that when computing a reduced (partial) Gröbner basis, the linear equations are already in echelon form. Table 1 summarizes experimental results with Magma V2.14 on an Opteron 252 with 2.6 GHz. In case of a successful attack, the memory requirement was typically modest. We aborted computations where the memory consumption was large (several Gigabyte), and counted these cases as failed attacks as well. Certainly, there is room for improving our simple approach, but already in the present form, it seems fair to consider the attack as practical.
Conclusion
The above discussion gives ample evidence that in the proposed form the authentication scheme put forward in [2] does not provide strong cryptographic security guarantees: In experiments with moderate computational resources, secret keys or alternative secret keys could often be found within minutes.
